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To BAN OR NOT TO BAN AN AMERICAN TALIBAN?
REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP & STATELESSNESS IN A
STATECENTRIC SYSTEM
J.M SPECTAR*
INTRODUCTION
This article examines differing conceptions of U.S. citizenship in the
debate' over about the so-called American Taliban, John Walker Lindh,2 and
the question of denationalization. The article argues that while the dominant
strains of citizenship theory may be invoked in support of denationalizing
the American Taliban, the weight of opinion in American constitutional law
and history, as well as an emerging international norm against statelessness,
disfavor citizenship, revocation, exile or banishment. The first part of the ar-
ticle describes the ensuing citizenship conversation in the wake of revela-
tions about certain Americans serving in the Taliban and al Qaeda-a dia-
* Ph.D. 1999, Claremont Graduate University; M.A.P. 1997, Claremont Graduate
School; J.D. 1992, University of Maryland School of Law; M.A. 1992, George Washington
University; M.B.A. 1989, Frostburg State University; B.A. 1989, University of La Verne. As-
sociate Provost for Academic Affairs & Professor of Political Science, University of
Scranton, PA.
1. This article was written in the course of preparing for a citizenship debate against Pro-
fessor Jonathan Turley of George Washington University on April 12, 2002. The debate spon-
sored by Princeton University's Whig-Cliosophic Society was captioned "Should the U.S. re-
voke John Walker's Citizenship?" I must express my gratitude to Professor Turley for being a
most worthy and engaging adversary. In addition to appreciating the civil and professional
tone of the debate, several members of the audience attested to the enlightening and edifying
nature of the conversation. While this article features several arguments made in the debate,
the article does not purport to present an account of Professor Turley's positions during the
debate. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Turley for his profound in-
sights and witty delivery. To read more about the debate, see Legal Scholars Debate Loss of
Citizenship, TRENTON Ttrvs, Apr. 12, 2002. The article is dedicated to all such academics and
civic-minded public intellectuals who engage the public on contemporary issues.
2. Although the case of John Walker Lindh was the most notorious, several other Ameri-
can-born citizens were affiliated in some capacity with the al Qaeda or Taliban organizations.
Since the government's case against John Walker was settled in a plea bargain, this article
refrains from assessing the man's guilt or innocence. Instead, the article is a reflection on the
ensuing and enduring citizenship conversation triggered by Mr. Walker's most bizarre odys-
sey.
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logue tinged with clarion calls for banishment or revocation of citizenship.
Then, in Part II, the article examines various theories of citizenship and their
implications for the Walker debate. After presenting the conceptions of citi-
zenship as postulated by liberals and civic republican theorists, the article
argues that both strains of citizenship theory appear to allow for the possibil-
ity of revocation-especially where treason is involved. In Part III, the arti-
cle examines the jurisprudence of denationalization, focusing especially on
the Supreme Court's rulings and reasoning with respect to involuntary expa-
triation of native-born citizens. The article argues that given the Court's
view of the 14th Amendment and citizenship, it is highly unlikely that a de-
nationalization proceeding against Walker would succeed absent compelling
evidence of treason. In Part IV, the article argues that in addition to the
Court's traditional hostility to revocation, the practice is also disallowed by
principles of international human rights law, specifically, the emerging norm
against statelessness.
I. THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE AMERICAN TALIBAN AND THE
CITIZENSHIP CONVERSATION
In October 2001, the United-States and its allies retaliated for the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America against the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan.3 As the Taliban forces began to crumble and surren-
der, Americans were shocked to learn that one of the captives was a native-
born American citizen-John Walker Lindh of Marin County, California.4
3. The horrendous act of mega-terror carried out by nineteen members of Osama bin
Laden's al Qaeda network killed or wounded thousands of Americans and significantly desta-
bilized the global economy.
4. Walker, who reportedly spent his early teen years dabbling in rap music and ghetto
chic, abandoned those interests for a most consuming passion for Islam and all things Muslim.
See A Long Strange Trip to the Taliban, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 33. In late 1998,
Walker left the comfort of Northern California to go to Yemen because he believed it was the
closest thing to the "pure" language of the Quaran. Id. at 34. By the end of 1998, Walker mi-
grated to Pakistan where he reportedly lived an ascetic and austere life of intense religiosity,
marked by an effort to memorize all 6,666 sentences of the Quaran. Id. at 30. Suleyman al-
Faris, as he was known, slept on a simple rope bed in a house with neither running water nor
electricity after 10 p.m., and he reportedly refrained from socializing even with other Mus-
lims. id. In April 2001, Walker fled the hot weather in Pakistan for the "cooler mountains"
and according to news reports, began a seven-month dalliance with militant fundamentalism.
Id. By May 2001, Walker, who expressed interest "in getting a bird's eye view of how Sharia
was being applied," reportedly "gravitated" towards the Taliban. Id. at 35. In late Spring
2001, Walker who had become, by his own admission, a "self-described jihadist" joined a
"paramilitary training camp" run by Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), a terrorist group commit-
ted to ending Indian rule in Kashmir. See Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, American Fighter With
Taliban Could Face Life Prison Sentence, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at A4. According to the
affidavit, studies at the camp included "propaganda speeches, firearms training and some un-
specified 'special operations' training." id. In June 2001, Walker left Pakistan for the moun-
tains of Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Since he spoke
Arabic and not the local languages, the Taliban "referred him" to al-Farook, an al Qaeda
[Vol. 39
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As Walker's odyssey came to light, he increasingly became the bete noire of
talk radio shows, websites, and chat rooms. There was growing sentiment for
his conviction for alleged sundry crimes as well as for revocation of his U.S.
citizenship.5 The emerging consensus was that the facts were largely incon-
trovertible and any legal defenses were merely procedural inconveniences to
be endured before the inevitable banishment or execution.6 Many were will-
ing to abandon traditional notions of fairness in favor of Kangaroo proce-
dures in the heat of the moment. Some suggested Walker and any other
American-Taliban should either be tried for treason, sedition, or terrorism,
and they urged the government to revoke their U.S. citizenship and turn
them over to the Afghans.7 Others suggested that Walker be immediately
put to death without a trial, urging that the authorities take him to New York,
"let him loose and let people there take care of him," or that he should be left
in Afghanistan.8 As one visitor to a chat room stated, since Walker's could
be considered treasonous, "[giving] him a trial simply because he is techni-
training camp. Id. In late November 2001, Walker, famished and exhausted, was captured by
Northern Alliance forces. Id.
5. See Gary Langer, Poll: Charge Walker, Dec. 10, 2002, at http://abcnews.go.com/ sec-
tions/politics/DailyNews/pollO11210.html (last visited May 10, 2003). An ABCNEWS.com
poll conducted in December 2001 revealed that 34 percent of Americans felt Walker should
be charged with treason and twenty four percent favored other punishment "ranging from re-
voking Walker's citizenship to executing him." Id.
6. Yet, contrary to popular opinion, many legal authorities recognized that the govern-
ment faced some particularly daunting hurdles. The circumstances of Walker's capture and
his subsequent custody and interrogation could have triggered some potentially insurmount-
able constitutional defenses, including fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment arguments. For
example, a central issue in the case against Walker was the intentionality of Walker's actions
and the voluntariness of his actions and statements. Courts have looked at factors such as
whether a suspect was threatened or drunk with respect to whether he made a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Legal scholars saw several potential lines of argument: Nathan Lewin, a
prominent Washington lawyer said he expected lawyers to argue that in the chaos of war in
Afghanistan, "the injured Mr. Walker could not have grasped the implications of declining a
lawyer." See William Glaberson, Whether Walker Knew of Counsel is Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2002, at AI7. Yale Kamisar, an expert on Miranda rights at the University of Michigan
Law School, suggested the length of time Walker was held without his family being able to
communicate with him might undermine the government's case. Id. Professor Kamissar said
the courts had not defined how long the authorities might hold a suspect without disclosing a
lawyer had been hired to represent him, authorities could probably justify questioning a sus-
pect for hours or days without telling him a lawyer had been hired to represent him. Id. Yet,
Kamissar noted that when detention and questioning "turns to a couple of days or more...
the balance shifts in favor of the defense" in its assertion that a suspect should be told a law-
yer has been hired to represent him. Id. As Professor Lewin stated, "If you've got a constitu-
tional right to have a lawyer, you have a right to talk to someone who will hire you a lawyer."
Id.
7. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 5. One respondent to the ABCNEWS poll conducted De-
cember 5-9, 2001, stated, "Hold him prisoner until the war is over, then take away his citizen-
ship.' Id. Another opined, "Whatever the Afghan people want to do with him. He deserves
the same punishment that they would give their own people. I think it should be up to them to
decide." Id. Some compatriots were terse: "Hang the bastard." Id.
8. Michael Janofsky, For Many, Verdict's in for Taliban Volunteer (and Skip the Trial),
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B4.
20031
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cally an American citizen would not be fair."9 In his characteristically re-
strained yet effective manner, Professor Turley, during a formal debate with
this writer, argued that the U.S should revoke John Walker's citizenship."°
Even the relatively younger demographic group that watches and surfs
the ChannelOne website participated in a vibrant citizenship debate. A sam-
pling of the comments on ChannelOne revealed a widely shared view that
Walker should be exiled and banned for treason and betrayal:
Karena: "I don't think Walker should be let back in the United States be-
cause he's basically ruined his citizenship and showed the United States
that he has betrayed us and even though he hasn't even killed an Ameri-
can ....
Gb: "I think they should not let him back into the U.S. because he left the
country in the first place. He fights for the Taliban so we should ban him
from the country or trial [sic] him for treason., 12
Samantha: "I think that the USA should ban anyone who does fight for the
Taliban [sic] soldiers.... I do not think that his parents should have let
him go in the first place though, so it is partly their fault."' 3
The Attorney General of the United States, John Ashcroft, seemed to be
stoking the public vitriol against Walker when he told millions of TV view-
ers that Walker betrayed America. 4 It is said the Attorney General's staff
were so disgusted by Walker that they wanted to "make an example of
9. See Ginger Malcolm, Wrong Team, American Among Taliban Captured in Prison Up-
rising, Readers Comments, http://www.channelone.com (last visited, Mar. 2, 2002).
10. See generally, Legal Scholars Debate, supra note 1.
11. See Malcolm, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id. As these comments indicate, many who called for Walker's banishment were mis-
informed about the implications of serving in a foreign army. As Professor Turley has ob-
served the U.S. government does not clearly prohibit American nationals from fighting in for-
eign wars: "It's always been a gray area.... The government has often preferred to remain
blissfully ignorant of Americans engaged in that type of activity unless the U.S. citizen is
joining a hostile force." David Crary, Many Americans Have Fought For Foreign Armies,
PRAVDA, Dec. 24, 2001, at http://english.pravda.ru/usa/2001/12/24/24335.html (last visited,
May 10, 2003). From the French Revolutionary war, to volunteers on the Allied side before
U.S. entered WWI & WWII, thousands of Americans have fought for foreign armies. Id.
Nonetheless, in the din of the public outcry against Taliban John, these historical precedents
were mere legal niceties as many lambasted Walker for his ties to the Taliban regime and its
doppelganger, the al Qaeda organization.
14. In a letter to the Editor of the New York Times, District Judge Avern Cohn opined
that Attorney General John Ashcroft's public announcement of the filing of the complaint
against John Walker appears to have violated long standing Justice Department "guidelines on
release of information related to criminal proceedings that are entitled to ensure that a defen-
dant is not prejudiced when such an announcement is made. These guidelines severely limit
what a Justice department lawyer may say. Mr. Ashcroft's statement and news conference
seem to suggest that there is really no need for a trial." Hon. Avem Cohn, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at A22.
266 [Vol. 39
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him."' 5 An irate Ashcroft echoed the public's mood: "Youth is not absolu-
tion for treachery."' 6 Mr. Ashcroft declared Walker "chose to train with Al
Qaeda, chose to fight with the Taliban, [and] chose to be led by Osama bin
Laden."' 7 Rejecting the views of those who defended Walker's actions as a
matter of choice by a member of a free society, Ashcroft chimed "personal
self-discovery is not an excuse to take up arms against your country."' 8
As the debate raged over Walker's citizenship, certain critics of liberal
individualism blamed the ideology and its excesses for the treacherous con-
duct of Walker and his ilk. Somewhat ironically, the circumstances of
Walker's upbringing seemed to fit conveniently with this caricature of liber-
15. See A Long, Strange Trip, supra note 4, at 36. The government's lawyers acted on
cue. In a blistering 10-count indictment delivered on February 6, 2002, the government
charged Walker with, inter alia, participating in conspiracy with al Qaeda to harm U.S. citi-
zens. As evidence of guilt, the government pointed to Walker's military training and partici-
pation in or with the Taliban or al Qaeda; incriminating e-mails to his family; Walker's state-
ments during interrogation by FBI; his refusal to cooperate with authorities when questioned
at the prison compound; his remaining with fellow Taliban or al Qaeda fighters for a week
after the uprising started; alleged corroborating evidence to support his statements to FBI and
incriminating statements to media when captured. See Excerpts From Government's Response
to the Petition by Lindh's Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A16.
16. David Johnston, Walker Will Face Terrorism Counts in a Civilian Court, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2002, at A1, A10. Quite noticeably, the Justice department resisted alleged efforts by
the Pentagon to use the military tribunal option supposedly advocated during NSC meetings.
Id. Additionally, Ashcroft indicated in his comments that the government would have difficul-
ties charging Walker with treason, noting that the Constitution imposes a "high evidentiary
burden to prove charges of treason," as it would require confession or a testimony of treason-
ous acts by two witnesses. Id. The absence of treason charges completely undermines any
case for denationalization-for in the absence of treason, the practice of denationalization en-
joys very little support.
17. David Johnston, Lindh Coerced After Capture Lawyers Assert, U.S. Indictment Is
Filed as Defense Seeks Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al. Ironically, there was little evi-
dence that Walker chose al Qaeda. In fact, the evidence suggested the contrary. When the
U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban began, Walker was sent to fight against the Northern
Alliance. Walker was reportedly given a choice by Mohammmad AI-Misri, an Egyptian who
allegedly managed the training camp: go abroad and conduct overseas operations against the
U.S. and Israel interests, or fight against the Northern Alliance. Bravin & Fields, supra note 4.
Walker declined AI-Masri's invitation to travel "outside Afghanistan to conduct operations
against the United States and certain Israeli targets," choosing instead to take on the Northern
Alliance. Id. See also Christopher Marquis, Document Paints Portrait of Committed Taliban
Fighter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.16, 2002, at A10.
18. Johnston, supra note 16. Statements such as these further fueled the public's percep-
tion that Walker had specifically and deliberately chosen to take up arms against the USA,
even if only indirectly. In one of its filings to the Court, the government referred to the NA as
its "ally" and thereby suggested that by taking up arms against the NA, Walker engaged in
battle against the U.S. See Excerpts from Government's Response, supra note 15. Yet, prior to
the events in question, it was not known that the NA was formally a military or political ally
of the United States. In fact, Walker's attorneys claim that Walker believed by siding with
Taliban against the NA, Walker was actually on the side of the United States. James Brosna-
han, Walker's chief lawyer said in court that the last that Walker heard, America had given
the Taliban $43 million to eradicate Afghanistan's notorious poppy fields that served as a
source of raw opium. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Judge Quickly Turns Down Lindh's Request
for Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A16. As Brosnahan stated, "He knew he was fighting
people not liked by the United States." Id.
2003]
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alism. Walker Lindh, who grew up in affluent Marin County, California, re-
portedly enjoyed a laissez faire life of privilege, pampering, and plenty of
opportunities for self-discovery. 9 It was insinuated that the permissive mo-
res of Walker's new-age parents and their social milieu was to blame for his
deviancy. Initially home-schooled by his mother, Walker was later sent to an
"elite alternative high school where students were allowed to shape their
own studies and had to check with their teacher only once a week."2 Others
blamed Walker's parents for not giving him guidance or teaching him to be
responsible and for giving him money to pursue his individualistic goals.2
As one angry resident of Longmont, Colorado stated: "It all goes back to
money. It gave him the possibility of going there. I'm sure [his parents] sent
him money a number of times."22 His parents were obliquely chided for be-
ing nonjudgmental about his conversion to Islam and for not objecting when
he dropped out of high school, taking the high-school diploma equivalency
exam instead.23 In one well-penned and caustic attack, Shelby Steele, a re-
search fellow at the Hoover Institution, blamed John Walker Lindh's esca-
pades on the post-'60s cultural liberalism of his Southern California parents:
[John Walker inhabited a] world where learning is self-referential, where
adults are only broadly tolerant. There are no external yes's and no's or
rights and rights here, just the fashionable relativism....
In these precincts, a little anti-Americanism becomes sophistication, a
mark of authenticity....
... This attitude, a kind of white American guilt, has shifted the culture
from noblesse oblige to radical chic.... The post-60s shift to what Tom
Wolfe called radical chic was essential a transfer of authority from tradi-
tional American culture to its former victims.
This liberalism thrives as a subversive, winking, countercultural hip-
ness.... [and] serves up self-hate to the young as idealism. 24
Given Walker's seeming predilection for unbridled self-discovery,
much of the debate about Walker was also a diatribe against the excesses of
liberal individualism and its excessively rights-based conception of citizen-
ship and self.
Walker's own self-indulgent comments before and after the highly
charged atmosphere of post September 11, 2001, did little to defuse the in-
19. See A Long, Strange Trip, supra note 4.
20. See id. at 33.
21. Janofsky, supra note 8.
22. Id.
23. See A Long, Strange Trip, supra note 4, at 34.
24. Shelby Steele, Radical Sheik, THE WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2002, at A 18.
[Vol. 39
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tensity of the public discussion about his citizenship rights. As he traveled in
search of religion, Walker wrote regular e-mails to his family showing a
deep-seated disenchantment with the policies of the American government.25
In fact, Walker's callous comments and his apparent lack of sensitivity to the
feelings of his fellow citizens may have been partly to blame for the ava-
lanche of calls for his banishment. Following Walker's capture and his sub-
sequent encounter with the media, Walker made many potentially troubling
statements about his role in Afghanistan and his feelings for fellow Ameri-
cans who suffered in the September 11 tragedy. Walker reportedly acknowl-
edged that he was a "jihadist" and told Newsweek he "supported" the Sep-
tember 11 attacks.26 With regard to the attack on the Pentagon, Walker stated
things like that happened in war.27
In spite of Walker's seeming callousness, some Americans appeared
more willing to grant him his rights of citizenship. On the other side of the
citizenship debate, some argued in chatrooms and on talk radio that Walker
was simply enjoying his freedoms of expression as an American:
Chelsea: "I think that maybe he just wanted to be different or that he feels
what we are doing to Afghanistan is maybe unfair." 28
Sebastian: "I don't think that it's fair that Americans should be treated
with hate when they stand up for what they believe in. This is suppose
[sicl to be a land of freedom and you can't even fight for what you believe
in. ,
29
Kevin: "He left America because the American government is just like the
Taliban.... Jon [sic] is just expressing himself. Nothing wrong with
that."30
Others were more inclined to treat Walker as a curiosity-a hapless lat-
ter day Odysseus who had wandered unto the wrong place at the wrong time
and compounded the problem by making potentially incriminating state-
ments under constitutionally ambiguous circumstances. Ironically, even the
President's first instinct was to view Walker as errant, but harmless young
man. Prior to being swayed by the public outcry against Walker, President
Bush called Walker a "poor fellow" who had been "misled."'"
25. Seelye, supra note 18.
26. See Colin Soloway, A U.S. Citizen on the Horror at Qala Jangi, Tale of an American
Taliban, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 34. As Walker emerged from captivity, a Newsweek
reporter asked him whether he supported the September 11 attacks. After hesitating briefly, he
stated: "That requires a pretty long and complicated explanation. I haven't eaten for two or
three days, and my mind is not really in shape to give you a coherent answer." Id. Then when
pressed, he said: "Yes, I supported it." Id.
27. See Excerpts From Government's Response, supra note 15.
28. See Malcolm, supra note 9.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See A Long, Strange Trip, supra note 4, at 32. In fact, the circumstances of Walker's
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Nonetheless, pro-Walker views remained distinctly in the minority as a
consensus emerged that Walker was a traitor whose expatriation would be a
form of expiation, a sort of primeval rite of national purification. Opinion
polls showed broad animus towards the American Taliban. In a Newsweek
poll, forty-one percent of Americans believed that Walker "should be
charged with treason and put on trial for fighting with the enemy."
32
The Walker debate shows that the national citizenship debate is alive,
heated, and well. Despite its acerbity and frequent hyperbole, some of the
commentary engendered by Walker's odyssey reveals a deep interest in the
concept of American citizenship. The renewed focus on citizenship is at
odds with the punditry of eschatologically-minded cognoscenti who bemoan
the "death of citizenship. 3 3 As Professor Ackerman has opined: "the prac-
tice of citizenship is disintegrating before our eyes" and "the rituals of citi-
zenship have been stripped down to a precious few."34 He observed that "It
is quite possible to live life in America today without ever dealing with oth-
ers as fellow citizens.. . focusing on our common predicament as Ameri-
cans." 35 Contrary to Professor Ackerman's assertion, however, "TV pundits"
do not hold a monopoly over dealing with each other as fellow citizens and
engaging in a type of conversation about "national citizenship. '36 In the
course of debating the Walker issue, the citizenship debate reached a cres-
capture and his subsequent incarceration were so unusually horrific that some contended they
were serious enough to impede successful prosecution of the government's case. Not surpris-
ingly, Walker's attorneys were quick to paint a picture of Walker as an unfortunate victim of
circumstances. They noted that when Walker was captured he was "exhausted, severely dehy-
drated and in physical and psychological shock that impaired his ability to speak." See Ex-
cerpt from Lawyers' Filing For Lindh: "Threatened Him With Death," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2002, at A12. They claimed that Walker's answers under interrogation were "coerced" and
"unreliable." Jess Bravin, Taliban John Lindh Faces New Charges, WALL ST. J. Feb. 6, 2002,
at B13. They further claimed the "alleged incriminating statements were extracted after sol-
diers threatened him with torture and death and ignored his requests for a lawyer." Id. Addi-
tionally, Walker's lawyers claimed that these interviews conducted by FBI agents on Decem-
ber 9 and 10 while in detention near Kandahar were conducted under "highly coercive
conditions" after eight days of brutal confinement in freezing weather. Johnston, supra note
17, at Al, A12. The attorneys also claimed he had been repeatedly denied legal representation
while under government custody. See William Glaberson, The Legal Case, Ashcroft's Mes-
sage: Case Against Walker is Solid, N.Y TIMES, Jan.16, 2002, at A10. Furthermore, Walker's
lawyers averred their client "was abused by his American captors, who bound him to a
stretcher with heavy tape, placed him in a windowless metal container, gave him little food or
medical attention and refused to allow him to speak with a lawyer." Johnston, supra note 17,
at Al. Finally, Walker's lawyers claimed their client "believed the only way to escape the tor-
ture of his current circumstance was to do whatever the agent wanted" and that was when he
reportedly "allegedly voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel and
answered questions." Bravin, supra, at B 13.
32. See A Long, Strange Trip, supra note 4, at 36.
33. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Devane Lecture Series & Readings, The Death of Citi-
zenship? http://www.yale.edu/yale300/democracy/media/feb20.htm (last visited Mar. 2002).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 39
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cendo as many argued that Walker had forfeited his right to American citi-
zenship. The rest of this article is devoted to examining the public's demand
for Walker's denationalization in light of citizenship theories, Supreme
Court precedents, and international law.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CITIZENSHIP AND DENATIONALIZATION
A. Citizenship Theories
Below, the article examines various theories of citizenship and their im-
plications for the Walker debate. In large measure the citizenship debate is a
polemic between liberals versus communitarians, and the conceptions of the
good or the right held by both camps has implications for, inter alia, the
question of denationalization. After presenting the conceptions of citizenship
and self as postulated by liberals and civic republican theorists, the article
argues that various approaches appear to permit revocation-if only in the
most extreme cases such as those involving treason.
As a general matter, citizenship is variously conceptualized in terms of
political institutions that are free to act-on the basis of national sover-
eignty-according to the will37 and interests3" of their citizenry, as well as
with political authority39 over such citizenry. Thus, Walzer defines a citizen
as a member of a political community, who is entitled to receive certain
benefits provided by the state (particularly protection) and who is expected
to fulfill certain "common expectations" and responsibilities that are appur-
tenant to that membership.' ° Four general conceptions of citizenship have
emerged: (1) "Citizenship as legal status," which centers on whom the State
considers a citizen and the formal basis for the rights and duties of persons in
the State;4 (2) "citizenship as rights," which constitutes a broader view of
37. Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship; The Future of Nationality
in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519, 520 (2000) (citing ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS (H. Rackman trans., 1959)).
38. Id. (citing JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Charles Frankel trans.,
1947)).
39. Id. (citing JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley trans.,
1955)).
40. MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT DOES IT MEAN To BE AN AMERICAN? ESSAYS ON THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 82-95 (1996). Expectations citizens have for each other include (I)
"some degree of commitment or loyalty" as well as service and civility, (2) a commitment to
defending the homeland "even to risk their lives in its defense;" (3) an expectation that citi-
zens obey laws and "maintain a certain decorum of behavior" or a degree of "relative civil-
ity;" (4) an ethos of tolerance and participation and (5) active participation in political life. Id.
The citizen-at least the "pluralist citizen"-should not merely enjoy the benefits of her
status in a passive manner, but should be actively engaged in the "political and moral dimen-
sions of citizenship" in order to realize a vital conception of a "political community." See
MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS, ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR AND CITIZENSHIP 205, 210,
217-25.
41. Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 37, at 522 (citing Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Dena-
tionalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 506 (2000)).
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citizenship as a bundle of rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for par-
ticipation that delineate the scope of sociopolitical membership inside a
community;42 (3) "citizenship as political activity," which reflects the so-
called republican conception that centers on political participation; and (4)
citizenship as a type of collective identity and sentiment.43 As the Interna-
tional Court of Justice held in Nottebohm, citizenship or "nationality is a le-
gal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, genuine connection
of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of recipro-
cal rights and duties."44
B. Liberal Individualism and the "Thin" Conception of Citizenship
Liberal individualism, a rights based conception of citizenship, has its
roots in the philosophies of Kant and Mills on one side of the continuum and
Nietzsche and Satre on the other end.45 Liberal theory of citizenship does not
set forth any single notion of the ends of citizenship or the good life. Rather,
it advances procedures and rules, along with an institutional framework, in
which all persons-according to their own ends and interests-seek their
own conceptions of good lives for themselves. 46 This framework represents a
broader understanding of citizenship as a bundle of rights, responsibilities,
and opportunities for participation that delineate the scope of sociopolitical
membership in a polity.4 7 Yet, liberal individualism is arguably a thin con-
ception of citizenship because nothing is absolutely required of an individual
except respect for others' freedom as well as "the minimal civic duties of
keeping the state in being," which includes paying taxes, voting, and a will-
ingness to defend the state from external or internal enemies.4 8
The "dominant liberal citizenship paradigm" is a rights-based account of
citizenship that prioritizes the individual.49 Liberal individualism "accords
the individual not only ontological and epistemological priority, but moral
priority as well."5 Individuals as citizens are captains of their fate, who are
presumed to be, and who ought to be, in control of their lives on all matters
of consequence."1 The individual is "an autonomous and responsible moral
agent" free to choose and pursue his own life project.52 The term "liberal in-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
45. Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community, in Th1E CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 76 (Ger-
shon Shafir ed., 1998).
46. Id.
47. Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 37, at 522 (citing Bosniak, supra note 41).
48. Oldfield, supra note 45.
49. Ruth Lister, Dialectics of Citizenship, 12:4 HYPATIA 2, http://iupjournals.org/ hypa-
tia/hypl2-4.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
50. Oldfield, supra note 45, at 76.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 77.
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dividualism" refers to the fact that, as persons, individuals need "freedom
and security to pursue their lives unhindered.
' 13
Citizenship under the liberal view is a "status to be sought and, once
achieved, to be maintained."54 Thus, the liberal individualist conception of
citizenship is intensely individual rights-oriented--and it is effectively a le-
galistic conception of citizenship. The conception of citizenship as a "legal
or juristic concept" is central to liberal individualism and dates back to Ro-
man times. Following Gauis' division of the universe into "persons, actions
and things," and the elaboration of property as a person's relationship to a
thing, citizenship became linked with jurisprudential notions of "possessive
individualism."55 In effect, the individual "came to be by nature a proprietor
or possessor of things," and with relationships to things fixed by law, a "citi-
zen came to mean someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the
law's protection."5 6 As citizenship became a legal status, the citizen came to
be seen as a member of a "legal community" with a type of "legal standing"
and, with respect to his or her affairs, bearing various rights to certain pos-
sessions, immunities, and/or expectations.57 With respect to this conception
of citizenship as a "legal or juristic concept," "the legalis homo" denotes
"one who can sue and be sued in certain courts."5 8
With respect to the rights-based approach to citizenship, citizens view
themselves as free persons in three important ways: (1) Citizens are free in
that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral
power to have a conception of the good";59 (2) Citizens view themselves as
free in that "they regard themselves as self-originating sources of valid
claims";6 ° and (3) Citizens are "regarded as capable of taking responsibility
for their ends, and this affects how their various claims are assessed."'" The
rights based approach is a thin conception of citizenship because individuals
participate in society primarily out of a need and desire to maximize self-
interest.6 2 Within this conspectus, justice is required as a "remedial" value, to
ensure that every person's search for the good life does not fundamentally
undermine the search by others for their own good lives.63
53. Id.at 76.
54. Id.
55. Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES
36, supra note 45.
56. Id. at 36-37.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 37.
59. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness in the Liberal Polity, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES
63, supra note 45.
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id. at 65.
62. Michael Walzer, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 18:1 POLITICAL THEORY 6
(1990).
63. Oldfield, supra note 45.
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The liberal individualist conception of citizenship can be used as "a
positive concept." That is, it describes a "legal-political status that some in-
dividuals enjoy" and that is out of the reach of many others.64 In this regard,
citizenship denotes a "relationship between individuals and the polity in
which citizens owe allegiance to their polity."65 Contemporary political de-
bates and movements seek to fulfill the promise of the rhetoric by empower-
ing individuals to exercise their rights and instituting limits on political au-
thorities to check infringements on individual rights.66 An essential and non-
derogable right of citizens is their claim to be secure from threatening forces
given the threat that the state and society often pose to individual sover-
eignty. 6" Yet, citizens may have to defend the polity when it is threatened
and "they must not betray it."68 Only in the event of treasonous betrayal
would it be proper to resort to revocation of birthright citizenship.
C. Civic Republicanism, Communitarianism and the "Thicker?"
Conception of Citizenship
The civic republican perspective harkens back to Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Rousseau, and seventeenth-century English and eighteenth-century Ameri-
can republican thought.69 The classical (Aristotelian) ideal entails "a defini-
tion of the human person as a cognitive, active, moral, social, intellectual,
and political being," such that a person could not be "fully human unless he
ruled himself' and took part in the decisions shaping his or her life.7" For Ar-
istotle, the citizen rules and is ruled by sharing in the administration of jus-
tice and in "indefinite offices" including the dicast (judge and jury) and as a
member of the ecclesia or the assembly of citizens.7 Later, writing in the
sixteenth century, Jean Bodin stated that the citizen was "one who enjoys the
common liberty and protection of authority."72 Building on Aristotle's non-
instrumental conception of politics, Pocock stated, "citizenship is not just a
means to being free; it is the way of being free itself."7 3
64. Peter H. Schuck, The Re-evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEORGETOWN
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1997).
65. Id.
66. Oldfield, supra note 45.
67. Id.
68. Schuck, supra note 64.
69. Oldfield, supra note 45, at 79.
70. Pocock, supra note 55, at 35. As Pocock observes, Aristotle's account of equality
was not all inclusive and some were incapable of achieving such equality. His ideal of citizen-
ship as expressed also contained several features that persisted for two millennia, to wit, that
"the citizen must be a male of known genealogy, a patriarch, a warrior, and the master of the
labor of others (normally as slaves.)" Id. at 33.
71. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, noted in CHRISTIE AND MARTIN, TEXT AND READINGS
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 45-46 (2d ed., 1995).
72. Walzer, supra note 40, at 215.
73. Pocock, supra note 55, at 34.
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Civic republican citizenship has four main components: (1) The republi-
can citizen assuredly enjoys rights required to carry out his/her private ends
and to perform his/her public role;74 (2) rights are associated with a corre-
sponding set of obligations;75 (3) civic republicanism requires a disposition
to actively defend the rights of other members of the political community;76
and (4) the republican citizen is actively engaged in both the formal and in-
formal domains of politics.7 The civic republican tradition posits two condi-
tions for citizenship; the individual becomes a citizen by fulfilling the obli-
gations of the "the practice of citizenship," and individuals cannot be
expected to engage in the practice of citizenship without active support.78 To
that end, citizens are to be empowered and provided with sufficient motiva-
tion in order to perform "stem and important tasks which have to do with the
very sustaining of their identity. '79 These institutional props enable individu-
als to "reach a degree of moral and political autonomy" unattainable under
the rights-based account.8" Regarding the communitarian-republican view,
citizenship is difficult to achieve in the modem world because people lack
resources, opportunities, and attitudes of mind, motivation, or "habits of the
heart.""' The concept of citizenship as a practice embodied in the civic re-
publican tradition "entails community," not community as in formal organi-
zation, but community with respect to any settings where individuals "take
the practice of citizenship seriously."82 Republican citizenship prioritizes
"the interests of the wider community," and regards citizenship as a "de-
manding political obligation." 3 Political solidarity emerges from "the equal-
ity of a shared identity," that is at least partially "self-determined and cho-
sen." 4 In deciding on an identity, citizens actively distinguish between
fellow citizens, outsiders, strangers, or potential enemies.15 In the civic re-
publican tradition, "citizenship is exclusive: it is not a person's humanity
that one is responding to, it is the fact that he or she is a fellow citizen, or a
stranger.... [T]o remain a citizen one cannot always treat everyone as a
human being."8 6 To ensure capacity for such an important choice "natural"
74. David Miller, Bounded Citizenship in COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP 36 (Kimberly
Hutchings & Roland Dannreuther eds., 1999)
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Oldfield, supra note 45, at 79.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 86-87. Opportunities are conceived as an appropriate institutional setting;
meanwhile, resources to effectively engage in the practice of citizenship include "health, edu-
cation, and a reasonable income." Id. at 86-87.
82. Id. at 89.
83. Lister, supra note 49, at 2-3.
84. Oldfield, supra note 45, at 80.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id.
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or "precivic" persons have to be intentionally formed or "molded" to for
their role as active citizens through education as well as a "prevalent set of
mores and practices conducive to sustaining the civic ideal."87 Civic educa-
tion and transformation may require a "civil religion" as well as a "profes-
sion of faith in the community. ' 8
D. Citizenship Theories and Denationalization
In particular, the liberal approach can easily justify revocation if rights-
bearing members are desirous of excluding offending behaviors or persons.
Under the liberal paradigm's "consent perspective" of citizenship, outraged
members of the community could legitimately claim the right to expel
Walker for his actions-whatever they may have been. The "consent per-
spective" conceives of citizenship as "membership in a state generated by
mutual consent of a person and the state." 89 Rousseau (and later Kant) pro-
vided citizenship its modem philosophical grounding, linking it to the theory
of consent.9" The citizen within the Social Contract is a "free and autono-
mous individual, who makes, or shares in the making of, the laws he
obeys."91 It is argued that by throwing off their allegiance to the Crown,
American revolutionaries resolved to become "citizens of a new state consti-
tuted solely by the aggregation of their individual consents. ' 92 Professors
Schuck and Smith argue that consensual citizenship is "more legitimate.in
theory, more flexible in practical policy problems, and more likely to gener-
ate a genuine sense of community among all citizens than the existing [and
ascriptive jus soli] scheme."93
However, the consent approach provides a theoretical basis for revoca-
tion such as might occur when existing members deem another member's
behavior totally. objectionable and a threat to the rights of all the polity's
members. Schuck and Smith argue that the requirement of "mutual consent"
might mean "a society could freely denationalize citizens against their will,
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1488 (1986). Philosopher John Locke viewed as the exemplar of the "transition from ascrip-
tive subjectship to consensual citizenship" maintained that a child did not attain citizenship
until s/he could legitimately give consent upon reaching adulthood. PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT, ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN
POLITY 23-24 (1985).
90. Walzer, supra note 40, at 212.
91. Id. at 211. "obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty." JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. 1, ch. 8 (1950).
92. Schuck & Smith, supra note 89, at 1.
93. Id. at 4-5. Professors Schuck and Smith, proponents of the "consent" approach are
troubled by illegal immigration, particularly the automatic acquisition of citizenship by chil-
dren of illegal immigrants as required by a jus soli scheme. David A. Martin, Membership and
Consent: Abstract or Organic, II YALE J. INT'L L. 278 (1985).
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reducing their security and status, perhaps even leaving them stateless." 94
Similarly, David Martin observed that the exclusionary and "repressive po-
tential" associated with consensualism is "most pronounced when society
excludes those who realistically have no home elsewhere and therefore de-
serve the status of member in the only national society to which they are
connected." 95 If rights-based citizenship is dependent on members' consent,
then there is little to prevent the likes of Walker from arbitrary and "unlim-
ited expatriation. '"96 In addition, if the individual has the right to voluntarily
terminate citizenship, then it would appear that under a liberal consent ap-
proach, citizenship is also terminable at the will of the govemment. 97
Opponents of the consent approach argue that Schuck and Smith's "re-
visionist" attack on American citizenship practice should be opposed be-
cause of its exclusionary potential.98 In fact, as Neumann shows, the "con-
sensual strand realized its dangerous potential" in Dred Scott where Justice
Taney made Dred Scott's citizenship "turn upon the putative will and inten-
tion of the Framers to exclude all blacks from the American political com-
munity."99 At the same time, the narrow citizenship theory of modem liberal
individualism suggests it would be difficult to revoke citizenship for conduct
short of treason.
Similarly, even if Walker's claim to citizenship rested on social contract
theory it could still be revoked. The so-called contractarian "perspective fo-
cuses on the agreements among individuals made in process of creating a
state."' 0 This contractarian approach arguably provides "stability and le-
gitimacy to the development of constitutional law" as well as a useful way of
thinking about principles of moral philosophy and constitutional govern-
ance.'0 ' Nonetheless, citizenship may be revoked even under a theory that
treats the community as based on a contract. In fact, by its very nature, con-
tract based citizenship is inherently revocable under various scenarios. The
parties may at the moment the contract is entered into specify conditions or
circumstances that will trigger automatic revocation. For example, the par-
ties may specify that a failure to perform in whole or in part would be
grounds for termination or revocation of the contractual right. As Aleinikoff
94. Schuck & Smith, supra note 89, at 37.
95. Martin, supra note 93, at 294. Martin contends this was precisely the problem
"essential vice" in cases such as Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) and Dred Scott, 60 U.S.
393 (1856).
96. See Schuck & Smith, supra note 89, at 38.
97. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1489 (noting denationalization statutes make it plain
that government does not enter into the agreement believing it is terminable only by the indi-
vidual).
98. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 166 (1996).
99. Id. at 167.
100. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1490.
101. Id. at 1490-91.
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argued, the "notion of citizenship absolutely unrevokable by the state does
not seem to follow from contract theory." ' 2
Since communitarian perspective views citizenship as a "cooperative af-
fair" the theory, at first glance, seems to provide the best foundation for ir-
revocability of citizenship. After all, in light of the relationship between the
citizen and the community, the latter cannot cast out one of its own for doing
so would dismember the community itself."°3 With respect to the communi-
tarian view, the individual is an "encumbered self' situated in real society,
defined and constituted in part by her "relationships, roles, and allegiances"
and her relationship with the state is based on her "identification with and
immersion in the society's history, traditions, and core assumptions and pur-
poses."' 4 Thus, by the time most Americans are mature enough to compre-
hend concepts such as loyalty and allegiance, "they have already developed
a conception of self that incorporates American citizenship."'0 5 As Macln-
tyre contended, our lives make sense only when we relate our intentions and
actions to our history and the historical setting."0 6 The communitarian ap-
proach situates a person's life within a common tradition such that the his-
tory of one's life is embedded in the larger narrative struggle of a historically
and socially extended argument about the good life for all human beings.10 7
In this cosmogony, individuals are not entirely sovereign authors of their
lives, and they are also subordinate characters embedded in an "interlocking
set of narratives" peopled by other protagonists.'0 8 A person must acknowl-
edge the "variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations, and obliga-
tions" he/she inherits from the past of his/her family, city, tribe, and na-
tion.09 These inheritances are the givens or the "moral starting-point" that
102. Id. at 1493.
103. Id. at 1494.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VmTruE 206, 222 (2d ed. 1984). Regarding the role
and impact of the social or historical setting (conceived in a relatively inclusive manner) Mac-
Intyre writes: "A social setting may be an institution, it may be what I have called a practice,
or it may be a milieu of some other human kind. But it is central to the notion of a setting as I
am going to understand it that a setting has a history, a history within which the histories of
individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just because without the setting and its
changes through time the history of the individual agent and his changes through time will be
unintelligible." Id. at 206-07. Elsewhere, Maclntyre adds, "Narrative history of a certain kind
turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characrterization of human actions." ld. at
208.
107. Id. at 222. "Hence the individual's search for his or her good is generally and char-
acteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the individual's
life is a part ..... Id.
108. Id. at 218. The unity of an individual life, Maclntyre argues, "is the unity of a narra-
tive embodied in a single life. To ask 'What is good for me?' is to ask how best I might live
out that unity and bring it to completion. To ask 'What is good for man?' is to ask what all
answers to the former question must have in common." Id. at 218-19.
109. Id. at 220. "[Wle all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular cial
identity. I am someone's son or daughter ... I am a citizen of this or that city; a member of
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effectively gives each life its "moral particularity.""' Thus, the communi-
tarian conception of self is of an essentially shared relationship and "the
identity of the human self is bound up with and partially constituted by that
self's sense of meaning or significance of the objects and situations he en-
counters in his life.""' The self then is inextricably wrapped in a community
and a fully constituted person is effectively an 'intersubjective self as the
full definition of her identity must involve some reference to a defining
community within which she is embedded."'
The sanction of denationalization is not easily reconcilable with com-
munitarian and civic-republican theory. From the communitarian perspec-
tive, denationalization, like a "forced conversion" may be seen as "grossly"
and impermissibly intruding "upon a person's conception of self.""' 3 As Al-
einokoff put it, when a state "strips an individual of her citizenship, it may
well be tearing the self apart."' 14 Additionally, Aleinikoff contended dena-
tionalization should be disallowed because states should take "responsibility
for the individual it has helped to constitute," meaning, the person it has
"helped to endow" with "a set of values and relationships that precede any
conscious choice by the citizen (at least at birth)."' 5 "The state, like the fam-
ily, could punish, but it ought not banish."'"16
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court appear to reflect the
communitarian thesis against revocation even as they allow for limited dena-
tionalization in extreme cases. The reasoning in cases, such as Afroyim, ap-
pears to reflect this communitarian bias against revocation.' 7 In the words of
Justice Black, American citizenship "is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citi-
zenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.""' 8 It is therefore "com-
pletely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens
this or that guild or profession."
110. See STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SwIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 89-91
(1992) (citing MACINTYRE, supra note 106, at 220).
111. Id. at 107.
112. Id. at 110. As Charles Taylor argues, the "essential relation between selves and self-
interpretation entails an equally essential relation between selves and other selves-a relation
to community." Id. at 110 Taylor further argues that "any attempt to comprehend the integ-
rity and identity of human beings in. . . atomistic terms, to regard society as merely an aggre-
gation of such antecedently individuated atoms in the absence of which human beings would
still be human, is incoherent." Id. at 111-12. Thus through membership in a variety of social
groups, the individual identifies herself and is identified by others. She is simultaneously a
sister, daughter, member of household, village, tribe and state. See generally MACINTYRE, Su-
pra note 106.
113. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1495. Aleinikoff speculates that in certain cases, this
may be necessary as denationalization may be akin to "removal of a malignant cancer." Id. at
1495, n.106.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1496.
116. Id.
117. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S 253 (1967).
118. Id. at 267-68.
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temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizen-
ship."' 19 Under the Afroyim conception of citizenship as a "cooperative af-
fair," people as citizens are "constituted by, and are constitutive of, the soci-
ety in which they are raised."' 20 Even cases that put forth this view, however,
maintain denationalization may be appropriate for treason, subversion, or
wartime desertion, whereby the citizen effectively demonstrates that he or
she is completely .un-American and unattached to the core principles of the
society. 12 Yet, as Aleinikoff observed, "given the range of heinous crimes
that this nation regularly experiences, it is not easy to say what acts would be
so outr6 as to be un-American.' 22
These conceptions of citizenship are "linked rhetorically" and they can
be used to foment "citizenship talk" that is "heated... energetic and morally
charged.'23 These various citizenship theories permit revocation, particu-
larly where the offending conduct imperils the fate of the polity itself, thus
jeopardizing the rights of its members. In sum, both the liberal and commu-
nitarian approaches to citizenship complement each other, particularly on the
debate about revocation. As Schuck noted, the positive meaning can check
the normative meaning and its harsh exclusionary impulse: "When we are
tempted to say (or feel) that our fellow citizens should 'shape up or ship out'
or should 'love our country or leave it,' we may recall that our law does not
view citizenship as a reward for civic virtue. The target of criticism may re-
spond with what he imagines is a rhetorical trump: "It's a free country. 124
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF BANISHMENT: CITIZENSHIP REVOCATION IN
AMERICAN LAW
Throughout history, forfeiture of citizenship and the corollary practices
of banishment and exile have been used as punishment. 25 In the Roman
Empire, when people lost their freedoms, they "necessarily lost ... citizen-
ship" as well. 26 For example, a Roman sold into slavery as an insolvent
debtor, or condemned to the mines for his crimes as servus poenae, suffered
not just a loss of his freedom, but a loss of citizenship as well. 127 Similarly,
banishment was a weapon in the English legal arsenal for centuries. 128 De-
spite the frequent resort to banishment in the English legal system, the prac-
119. Id.
120. See Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1495.
121. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1497.
122. Id. at 1498.
123. Schuck, supra note 64, at 1-2.
124. Id. at2.
125. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170 n.23 (1963) (noting that dena-
tionalization or involuntary expropriation are evidently "punitive").
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing John W. Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance, 17 L.Q. REV. 270, 276
(1901)).
128. Id.
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tice was always considered draconian and excessive even by the standards of
the day.129 Throughout history, the Court has grappled with "contending
constitutional arguments in the context of certain basic and sometimes con-
flicting principles," involving the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citi-
zenship pitted against Congressional powers and the associated obligations
of individual citizens.' 30
There is a strong animus to denationalization in American political and
legal history. The U.S. Congress, particularly in its first hundred years, sel-
dom enacted denationalization legislation. 3' In fact, "on three occasions, in
1794, 1797, and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to enact
laws that would denote certain conduct as resulting in expatriation.' '132 Not
until 1865 did Congress pass what was later viewed as the first denationali-
zation statute-the Enrollment Act of 1865 (section 21).113 Subsequently, the
government recognized the right of expatriation in the Expatriation Act of
1868.134
In the twentieth century Congress passed more denationalization stat-
utes.' 35 The 1907 Expatriation Act was aimed at limiting dual citizenship and
its perceived ills. 136 In 1940, Congress subsequently added new grounds for
denationalization including serving in foreign armed forces, voting in a for-
eign election, accepting certain offices or employment in a foreign state, and
conviction for wartime desertion, treason, or attempt to forcibly overthrow
the government.37 In 1944, Congress authorized loss of citizenship for per-
sons who left the U.S. in wartime to avoid military service. 138 In 1954, Con-
gress provided for loss of citizenship for certain convictions under the Smith
Act.'3 9 The current statutory basis for revoking Walker's citizenship is 8
U.S.C. § 1481, entitled "Loss of Nationality by Native-Born or Naturalized
Citizen.' 14
0
129. Id. (citing Maxey, Loss of Nationality or Government Fiat?, 26 ALB. L. REV. 151,
164 (1962)).
130. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159-60.
131. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1475.
132. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
133. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1475. Section 21 provided deserters from military ser-
vice "shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of
citizenship." Id. Nonetheless, historian John Roche argues that "rights of citizenship" referred
to attributes of nationality such as the franchise. Id.
134. Id. at 1476.
135. Id. at 1476-77.
136. Id. at 1476.
137. Id. at 1477. The Immigration Act of 1952 amended the provision relating to em-
ployment in a foreign government. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (West 2002)
(a): A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturaliza-
tion, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts
with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality:
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These congressional statutes have led courts to increasingly take up
various forms of denationalization actions. Aleinikoff observed that over the
last century at least three categories of denationalization cases have emerged,
i.e., cases referring to the government's act of terminating citizenship. First,
in allegiance cases, denationalization proceedings were a result of withhold-
ing allegiance from the state-an act viewed as severing the nexus between
citizen and state. 4' Aleinikoff observed allegiance may lapse due to volun-
tary transfer as in express or even implicit renunciation; or allegiance may be
divided and/or be lacking as evinced by active disloyalty (treason) or gross
apathy. 42 Second, in the punishment cases, the state sought to deny the
benefits of citizenship from persons deemed undeserving. 43 Finally, in the
third category of cases related to "public order," proceedings are instituted
against individuals whose membership in the state presents a major threat to
national security and public safety.'"
An analysis of major denationalization cases shows the Supreme Court
has been wrestling with the contradictory jurisprudential principles inter-
twined in the citizenship debate. The Court has grappled with the conflicting
principles stemming from the precious nature of citizenship on the one hand
and the related obligations of citizens as well as the powers of Congress on
the other hand. 45 Whether inspired by civic myth or American exceptional-
ism, the cases reflect a judicial hostility against revocation of native-born
citizenship, a reverential attitude towards native-born citizenship as well as a
strong judicial bias against banishment and statelessness. Informed by the
(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of alle-
giance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the
age of eighteen years; or
(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed
forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or...
(4)(B) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or em-
ployment under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof,
after attaining the age of eighteen years for which office, post, or employment an
oath, affirmation, or declaration of allegiance is required; or
(7) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or
bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any of
the provisions of section 2383 of Title 18, or willfully performing any act in viola-
tion of section 2385 of Title 18, or violating section 2384 of Title 18 by engaging
in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of
the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he is convicted thereof
by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction.
id. (emphasis added).
141. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1473.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1474.
145. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 160.
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intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's reverential
attitude towards citizenship has resulted in a very heavy burden of proof in
denationalization cases and an increasingly demanding standard of review so
that birthright citizenship has emerged as a fundamental "super-right."' 46
A. The Framers' Intent
By most accounts, involuntary expatriation is seen as contrary to the in-
tent of the framers of the original Constitution as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment. The prevailing view at the constitutional convention, perhaps
inspired by English precedents and natural law, was that citizenship was ac-
quired by birth or naturalization and could only be lost with "the consent of
the sovereign.""' "[T]he central ascriptive principle" of Jus soli, or birth-
right citizenship, can be traced to feudal times.'48 Because subjectship to the
political potentate under whom one was born was deemed "natural-
sanctioned by divine will and rationally discoverable by natural law"-
persons who acquired allegiance to a new ruler were deemed to be "natural-
ized."' 49 According to Blackstone, an individual's obligation to the sover-
eign represented a "debt of gratitude [] which cannot be forfeited, canceled
or altered by any change of time, place or circumstance."' 5 ° Sir Edward
Coke gave an account of the English law of ascriptive citizenship in Calvin's
Case (1607) noting that the common law recognized as subjects of the king
all persons born in the realm and subject to his laws, including the children
of aliens. 5' Coke posited this was the result of personal relationship of alle-
giance owed to the King under natural law because of his protection of a
child at its birth and the "natural debt bound the subject for life."' 52 Never-
theless, the modem view announced by the Declaration of Independence
posits governments were "instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed," and could be altered or abolished when
146. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1486.
147. Id. at 1491. The Court favorably cited early English precedents in favor of the ir-
revocability of citizenship. For example in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
665-60 (1898), the Court referred to early English law precedents such as Calvin's Case (aka
the Case of Postnati) which held all persons born within the King's allegiance and subject to
his protection were citizens of the realm. Id. (citing Calvin's Case, 7 Eng. Rep. 1, 4b-6a, 18a,
18b (1608); LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN, COCKBURN ON NATIONALITY 7 (1869); A.V.
DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173-
77, 741 (1s" ed. 1896); Michael Gunlicks, Citizenship as a Weapon in Controlling the Flow of
Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of Citizenship to Children of Un-
documented Aliens Born in the United States, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 552 (1995)).
148. Martin, supra note 93.
149. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIL IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY 13 (1997).
150. Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 37 (citing Sm WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (1884)).
151. NEUMAN, supra note 98.
152. Id. at 167.
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they subvert their proper acts.1 53 Birthright citizenship is defended as "famil-
iar," "easy to apply," practical, and inclusive enough to embrace all persons
born in the United States, including children of illegal aliens.1 54
From its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court has held Fourteenth
Amendment birthright citizenship is virtually absolute and un-abridgeable.
Many were "greatly disturbed" by Dred Scott's impact on American blacks'
citizenship status.'55 To "protect" blacks after Dred Scott, citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment was given "permanence and security."' 56 In the
process leading to its passage, Senate sponsors were concerned that the
House version did not contain "any definition of citizenship."' 57 They feared
the citizenship recently granted to blacks under the Civil Rights Act could be
easily withdrawn by future Congresses.'58 To safeguard against this possibil-
ity, and to place a permanent check against governmental efforts to dena-
tionalize the new black citizens, they insisted on including "a constitutional
definition and grant of citizenship.'5 9 Consequently, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside."' 6' According to Senator Howard, the primary Senate
sponsor, the first clause was added to toughen the Fourteenth Amendment:
"It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what
persons are or are not citizens of the United States .... We desired to put this
question of citizenship and the rights of citizens ... under the civil rights bill
beyond the legislative power ... , "6
The framers clearly feared allowing the government to "rob a citizen of
his citizenship without his consent" by claiming to act under "an implied
general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other power generally
granted," which would frustrate the undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to wit, making the citizenship of black Americans permanent
and secure.' 62 The entire legislative history of the 1868 Act reveals there was
a "strong feeling" in the Congress that Fourteenth Amendment citizenship
could only be lost by voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the citizen
himself.' 163
153. SMITH, supra note 148.
154. See Schuck & Smith, supra note 89, at 90-91.
155. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263.
162. Id. at 263.
163. Id. at 265.
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Since the people are sovereign, the Government "cannot sever its rela-
tionship to the people by taking away their citizenship." '164 The Constitution
does not grant Congress an express power to denationalize and, although
Congress has a power to "prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization," it has
no power "to enlarge or abridge" Fourteenth Amendment citizenship.'65 De-
nationalization is not an act that is "necessary and proper" to execute a spe-
cifically granted power. 166 In his now famous dictum, Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "[c]ongress, once a person becomes a citizen, cannot deprive him
of that status," for the naturalized citizen "becomes a member of the society,
possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in view of the con-
stitution, on the footing of a native. 167 The "unequivocal terms" of the Four-
teenth Amendment 168 make birth "a sufficient and complete right to citizen-
ship" and no act of Congress can restrict, abridge or affect "citizenship
acquired as a birthright by virtue of the constitution itself."'169
The "constitutional rule" of the Fourteenth Amendment is unequivo-
cally "calculated completely to control the status of citizenship" by provid-
ing a permanent guarantee of citizenship that was not to be "shifted, can-
celed, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, ,or any
other governmental unit."170 Fourteenth Amendment citizenship is not "a
fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is acquired" yet arbitrarily de-
structible. 7' A reasonable reading of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates
that the citizenship guarantee is permanent unless and until the citizen volun-
tarily relinquishes it.'72
In Afroyim, the Court refused to uphold a Congressional statute revok-
ing citizenship because an American voted in a foreign election, which vio-
lated the statute, concluding the statute had the impermissible effect of
164. Id. at 257.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 261-62.
169. Id. at 265-66. The author quotes Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum in Osborn
to the effect that Congress under the power of naturalization has "a power to confer citizen-
ship, not a power to take it away," and noting:
Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the constitution upon
those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of congress, a fortiori
no act... of congress.., can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright by virtue
of the constitution itself ... The fourteenth amendment, while it leaves the power,
where it was before, in congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no au-
thority upon congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the constitution to
constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.
Id.
170. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 265-66. "This constitutional statement is to be interpreted in
light of pre-existing common-law principles governing citizenship." Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159
n.10.
171. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262.
172. Id.
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abridging, affecting, restricting, and taking away citizenship against the clear
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 3 Consequently, the Afroyim Court
held the Fourteenth Amendment protects every citizen from "a congressional
forcible destruction of his citizenship," by an act of Congress because every
citizen has "a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless
he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.'
174
Although the Fourteenth Amendment's express guarantee speaks of
citizenship "in the most positive terms," the Court has also noted that the
Constitution is silent about the permissibility of "involuntary forfeiture of
citizenship rights."'75 Two years after the Fourteenth Amendment was pro-
posed, Congress specifically considered and rejected "with little discussion"
several bills designed to impose involuntary expatriation on citizens who
committed certain acts. 176
B. Preciousness of American Citizenship
The Supreme Court has stated, "citizenship is a most precious
right,"177-"a right no less precious than life or liberty."' 78 Noting that it
would be "difficult to exaggerate [the] value and importance" of the "price-
less benefits" of American citizenship, the Supreme Court stated: "nowhere
in the world today is the right of citizenship of greater worth to an individual
than it is in this country.... By many it is regarded as the highest hope of
civilized men."' 79 The Kennedy Court stated American citizenship is "one of
the most valuable rights in the world today," the deprivation of which would
have "grave practical consequences." "80 American "citizenship is no light tri-
fle to be jeopardized any moment," '181 and revoking a person's citizenship is
173. Id. at 265-66.
174. Id. at 267-68. To determine whether citizenship has been voluntarily relinquished,
one must look on the facts of each case and that Congress could provide rules of evidence for
such proceedings. Id.
175. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159.
176. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 263-64. In a congressional debate on one of these expatriation
bills, Representative Van Trump of Ohio stated:
To enforce expatriation or exile against a citizen without his consent is not a power
anywhere belonging to this Government. No conservative minded statesman, no
intelligent legislator, no sound lawyer has ever maintained any such power in any
branch of the Government. The lawless precedents created in the delirium of
war ... of sending men by force into exile, as a punishment for political opinion,
were violations of this great law ... of the Constitution.
Id. at 264-65
177. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159.
178. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
179. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
180. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 160 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 235 (1953)).
181. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68.
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"in its consequences more serious than a taking of one's property, or the im-
position of a fine or other penalty. 182 In Klaprott, the Court reiterated, "to
take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than
life or liberty," ' 3 and in Trop, the Court indicated that the "fundamental
right of citizenship is secure" as long as a person does not voluntarily re-
nounce or abandon his citizenship.' 8
4
The Supreme Court's opinions suggest the right of citizenship is more
precious for native-born citizens. In Kungys, the Court noted that whereas
Congress has authorized a special procedure that may result in the revocation
of the citizenship of the "naturalized citizen," the precious right of American
citizenship of the "native-born citizen" is a "truly inalienable" right. 85 At the
same time the Court expressed concern with securing the precious right for
both native-born and naturalized citizens. In Klapprott, where the Court
frowned on the inadequacy of constitutional safeguards in denaturalization
proceedings, Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion noted that the Court's
rulings had effectively created "two classes of citizens in this country, one
secure in their status and the other subject at every moment to its loss by
proceedings not applicable to the other class."'
18 6
182. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122.
183. Klapprot, 335 U.S. at 616-17.
184. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).
185. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Kungys,
where the U.S. brought action to revoke a naturalized alien's citizenship, the Court had to de-
cide whether certain misrepresentations or concealments made by Kungys in connection with
his naturalization proceeding were "material" and, whether those misrepresentations rendered
Kungys' citizenship "illegally procured"because they established that he lacked the requisite
good moral character when he was naturalized thirty-four years earlier. (The Government
claimed Kungys had participated in executing over 2,000 Lithuanian civilians, most of them
Jewish, in Kedainiai, Lithuania, between July and August 1941 and it further alleged that in
applying for his visa and in his naturalization petition, Kungys had made false statements re-
garding the date and place of his birth and his wartime occupations and residence.) The Court,
per Justice Scalia, held "the test of whether Kungys' concealments or misrepresentations were
material is whether they had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service." Id. at 772. It reasoned the test of whether concealments or mis-
representations were "material" within the meaning of a statute providing for the denaturaliza-
tion of citizens whose naturalization certificates were procured by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation, was whether they could be demonstrated by clear, un-
equivocal and convincing evidence to have been predictably capable of affecting the INS's
decision. Id. The Court also held that the statute-providing that a person was not of good
moral character if he gave false testimony in order to secure immigration or naturalization
benefits-did not impose a materiality requirement for false testimony. Id. Thus, the Court
concluded Kungys' misrepresentation of the date and place of his birth in his naturalization
petition was not material within the meaning of INA section 1451. Id. The Court remanded
the case to the Third Circuit to determine whether the other misrepresentations or conceal-
ments that the District Court found to have been made in 1954 were supported by the evi-
dence and material to the naturalization decision under the prescribed standard bearing in
mind the unusually high burden of proof in denaturalization cases. Id. (citing Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944), and Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 158).
186. Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 619 (citing Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 167).
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C. A Very High Burden
Recognizing the preciousness of the right, the Court has noted that once
conferred, American citizenship "should not be taken away without the
clearest sort of justification and proof." '87 In actions to deprive one of "citi-
zenship previously conferred" the "facts and the law should be construed as
far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen." '88 In other words, al-
though citizenship conferred upon an alien can be "revoked or canceled on
legal grounds under appropriate proof," such a right "should not be taken
away without the clearest sort of justification and proof."' 89 The burden must
be met with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, which does not
leave the issue in doubt."'90 Even though denaturalization proceedings do
not fall "within the technical classification of crimes" the Court still empha-
sizes "the unusually high burden of proof in denaturalization cases."' 9 ' The
Court observed that the factors supporting the use of a very heavy burden are
largely the same in both contexts-"particularly critical is the immense im-
portance of the interests at stake,'92 the possibility of loss of liberty,'93 the
resultant stigmatization, 94 and the societal interest in the reliability of the
outcome."' 95 Justice Rutledge observed that notwithstanding what it is
called, denaturalization proceedings, where successful, have the harsh effects
of a penal or criminal conviction, save that the associated liability to deporta-
tion is a more severe penalty than is generally inflicted for crime.' 96 Thus, in
denaturalization cases, the government bears "a special burden," "an unusu-
ally heavy burden" that is "substantially identical with that required in
criminal cases-proof beyond a reasonable doubt."' 97 The Klapprott Court
stated that since denaturalization is an "extraordinarily severe penalty" with
"grave" consequences including deportation, loss of liberty, property, and
even family relationships, "it seems peculiarly appropriate that a person's
citizenship should be revoked only after evidence has established that the
person has been guilty of prohibited conduct justifying revocation."' 98 Using
this high standard, the Court has ruled that default judgments in
denaturalization cases are "intolerable."' 99 Justice Rutledge stated in his
187. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 158. As the Court noted in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), in light of
"the importance of citizenship," the Court has "evinced a decided preference for requiring
clear and convincing evidence to prove expatriation." Id. at 266.
191. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 776 (citing Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670
(1944)).
192. Id. at 795 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)) (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id. (citing Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 612).
194. Id. (citing Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23).
195. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64).
196. Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 611.
197. Id. at 611-612.
198. Id.
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zation cases are "intolerable."' 99 Justice Rutledge stated in his concurring
opinion in Klapprott, "ordinary civil procedures, such as this apply in suits
upon contracts and to enforce other purely civil liabilities, do not suffice for
denaturalization and all its consequences. 20' Further, he said, "[i]f citizen-
ship is to be defeasible for naturalized citizens, other than by voluntary re-
nunciation or other causes applicable to native-born citizens," the defeasance
should be "surrounded by no lesser protections than those securing all citi-
zens against conviction for crime." 20 ' Additionally, the Trop Court stated
that whenever the government is acting to revoke "the fundamental right of
citizenship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with spe-
cial diligence."202
Expatriation requires the "ultimate finding that the citizen has commit-
ted the expatriating act with the intent to renounce his citizenship," and Con-
gress could require proof of an intentional expatriating act by a preponder-
ance of evidence.0 3 In Vance, the Court affirmed the statutory presumption
under 8 U.S.C. § 1481 that expatriating acts, if proved, are presumed to have
been committed voluntarily. 4 The party claiming expatriation bears the
burden of proving the expatriating act was performed with the intent to re-
linquish citizenship.205 To prove expatriation, "an expatriating act and an in-
tent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" and when an expatriating act is proved, "it is constitutional to
presume it to have been a voluntary act until and unless proved otherwise by
the actor. '206
D. Minimalist Obligations Approach
In denationalization proceedings, the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to countenance revocation of citizenship for failure to perform obligations,
and it is concerned with embarking down a slippery slope that could con-
ceivably lead to demands for revocation for insubstantial reasons. Further,
the Court has been loathe to revoke citizenship for mere failure to perform
"citizenship obligations" or for actions that constitute bad citizenship. In
Trop, the Court stated:
Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. The duties of
citizenship are numerous, and the discharge of many of these obligations
is essential to the security and well-being of the Nation.... But citizen-
ship is not lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked. And the depri-
199. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200. Klapprot, 335 U.S. at 617.
201. Id. at 617-18.
202. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.
203. Vance, 444 U.S. at 267.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 270.
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vation of citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to ex-
press its displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that
conduct may be.207
The Trop Court recognized that the United States could suffer "serious
injury" as a result of a "failure to perform" the "basic responsibilities of citi-
zenship" such as paying taxes, serving in the military, as well as "full par-
ticipation in the manifold activities of the civilian ranks. 2 °8 While the gov-
ernment may punish "derelictions of the duties of citizenship," revocation of
citizenship is inappropriate.0 9
Although traditional punitive reasons for denationalization have been
limited to violations of laws against subversion, draft evasion, and wartime
desertion, Aleinikoff suggests the punishment theory may even allow dena-
tionalization for anti-social conduct such as murder, child abuse, or tax eva-
sion.210 Justice Black observed, citizens' obligations to pay taxes and obey
the laws are just as related to the nature of our citizenship as our military ob-
ligations.21" ' Yet, the danger is that the Court may, by analogy, "impose expa-
triation as punishment for any crime," including tax evasion, bank robbery,
and narcotics offenses.212
In Trop, the government argued "the necessary nexus to the granted
power is to be found in the idea that legislative withdrawal of citizenship is
justified in this case because Trop's desertion constituted a refusal to per-
form one of the highest duties of American citizenship-the bearing of arms
in a time of desperate national peril. '213 This simplistic proposition, as the
Court recognized, implied "a certain rough justice," for after all, it seems
only fair that "[h]e who refuses to act as an American should no longer be an
American. 21 4 The Court felt that a measure which purposefully denational-
izes deserters is really inspired by "naked vengeance" 215 and is actually an
arbitrary exercise of congressional power.216
In addition, certain offenses that are technically dubbed desertion "cer-
tainly fall far short of a 'refusal to perform this ultimate duty of American
citizenship,' 217 and thus "it stretches the imagination excessively to estab-
lish a rational relation of retribution to the ends purported to be served by
expatriation of the deserter.- 218
207. Trop, 356 U.S. at 92-93.
208. Id. at 92
209. Id. at 92-93.
210. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1474.
211. Trop, 356 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 112.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 113.
217. Id. at 112.
218. ld. at 113.
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The Kennedy Court frowned on the temptation to dispense with funda-
mental civil liberties during wartime or "under the pressing exigencies of
crisis.'"219 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Kennedy called denation-
alization a simplistic remedy "fraught with the most far-reaching conse-
quences.
' 220
The Supreme Court has also been wary of denationalizing persons on
grounds that they are insufficiently attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion. For example, in Schneiderman, where the Court laid down an unusually
high threshold for such cases, the Court held that the government failed to
carry its "burden of proving by evidence which does not leave the issue in
doubt that petitioner was not in fact attached to the principles of the Consti-
tution and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States" when he was previously naturalized. 22' The Court observed "the
many important and far-reaching changes made in the Constitution since
1787 refute the idea that attachment to any particular provision or provisions
is essential, or that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily not at-
tached to the Constitution. 222 Lack of attachment to the Constitution was
not shown merely because petitioner testified he wanted to change the Con-
stitution, noting that it was "possible to advocate such changes and still be
attached to the Constitution."223
Aleinikoff contends that denationalization should be based on conduct,
and marked by specific and identifiable acts that "demonstrate lapsed, trans-
ferred, or divided allegiance, not belief."224 He argues that "shifting to an al-
219. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 165.
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances.... [lIf society is disturbed by civil commo-
tion-if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if not
disregarded-these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those
intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other way can
we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by the
sacrifices of the Revolution.
Id.
220. Id. at 196 (Brennan, J., concurring).
It is too simple to suggest that it is fitting that Congress be empowered to extin-
guish the citizenship of one who refuses to perform the 'ultimate duty' of rising to
the Government's defense in time of crisis .... For if Congress now should declare
that a refusal to pay taxes, to do jury duty, to testify, to vote, is no less an abnega-
tion of ultimate duty-or an implied renunciation of allegiance-than a refusal to
perform military service, I am unable to perceive how this Court, on the dissent's
view, could presume to gainsay such a judgment.
Id.
221. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23.
222. Id. at 137-38.
223. Id. at 141-42.
224. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1500.
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legiance-based understanding of denationalization will naturally lead to gov-
ernment investigations of the loyalty of citizens." '25 There is a danger of a
slippery slope as even "contemptible citizens" may continue to have alle-
giance to the United States as well as adequate attachment to the core princi-
ples of the Constitution.226
Nonetheless, the Kennedy Court emphasized the citizenship obligations
and noted in the now oft quoted dictum that the constitution is not a suicide
pact:
While it confirms citizenship rights, plainly there are imperative obliga-
tions of citizenship, performance of which Congress in the exercise of its
powers may constitutionally exact. One of the most important of these is
to serve the country in time of war and national emergency. The powers of
Congress to require military service for the common defense are broad and
far-reaching, for while the Constitution protects against invasions of indi-
vidual rights, it is not a suicide pact. Similarly, Congress has broad power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation for the regula-
tion of foreign affairs. Latitude in this area is necessary to ensure effectua-
tion of this indispensable function of government. 227
E. Denationalization as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The hostility to denationalization in American jurisprudence has ironi-
cally led to the conclusion that depriving an American of citizenship may, in
certain cases, constitute cruel and unusual punishment and is barred by the
Eighth Amendment. 228 As the Trop Court concluded, state-sanctioned dena-
tionalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment and "of-
fensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands" because it
involves "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society"
and it is "a form of punishment more primitive than torture. "229 It is also "an
extraordinarily severe penalty"-a punishment that is "tantamount to exile or
banishment ' 230 and "patently excessive." 231 The consequences of denation-
alization, including statelessness (discussed below), "may be more grave
than consequences that flow from conviction for crimes, 23 2 not the least be-
cause it "destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries
in the development. 2 '33 Denationalization as punishment constitutes "an ex-
225. Id.
226. ld. at 1501.
227. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159-60.
228. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
229. Id. at 102.
230. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 791 (Stevens, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 792.
233. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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traordinarily severe penalty" and the "consequences may be more grave than
consequences that flow from conviction for crimes. 234
In determining that denationalization "subjects the individual to a fate
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment, ' 235 the Trop Court rejected the pervading notion that the death
penalty is "an index of the constitutional limit on punishment.- 236 Although
imprisonment and even execution may be appropriate for certain crimes, de-
nationalization is a "technique outside the bounds of these traditional penal-
ties is constitutionally suspect. '237 Furthermore, the death penalty "is not a
license to the government to devise any punishment short of death within the
limit of its imagination without violating the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 2
38
The Court concluded that "the exact scope" of the phrase 'cruel and un-
usual' punishment, as well as the "the basic policy reflected in these words is
firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice." '239 In
addition, the Court noted the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment con-
tinues to evolve, noting that it "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and the
scope is "not static.""' While the Court has not regularly ruled on Eighth
Amendment cases, it has nonetheless ruled certain practices are unconstitu-
tional. It readily ruled a punishment of 12 years in irons at hard and painful
labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records is "cruel in its exces-
siveness and unusual in its character." 241 Although the Court has not drawn
"precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness," the Trop Court ob-
served "if the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from the word
'cruel,' however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying some-
thing different from that which is generally done. '242 Denationalization as a
234. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., concurring).
235. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (noting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.")).
236. Id. at 99.
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are
forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a
day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. But it is equally plain that the existence of the death penalty is
not a license to the Government to devise any punishment short of death within the
limit of its imagination.
Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. Yet, the phrase harkens back to the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 and
the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. Id. at 99-100.
240. Id. at 99.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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punishment "certainly meets this test" because it is something different from
that which has been "generally done"; it was never explicitly endorsed by
the United States until 1940 and was never constitutionally tested until the
Trop case.243 As Justice Rutledge stated: "To lay upon the citizen the pun-
ishment of exile for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far
unknown to our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power."-24
4
By enacting statutes to "punish" citizens through denationalization, the pun-
ishment power is not "exercised within the limits of civilized standards," and
it infringes on human dignity.245 Thus, "the Eighth Amendment forbids Con-
gress to punish by taking away citizenship. ' 246
Penal laws, including "indeterminate sentences and parole added to the
traditional term of imprisonment" are generally designed to achieve the
"humane and effective" goal of rehabilitation or deterrence.247 Punishment
by expatriation clearly "constitutes the very antithesis of rehabilitation," for
excommunicating the offender literally makes him "an outcast. '248 Dena-
tionalization is likely to be counterproductive because stigmatizing the of-
fender and making him "uncertain of many of his basic rights," will more
likely tend to spur antisocial behavior.249 Furthermore, if unaccompanied by
banishment, expatriation may not achieve some of the desired effects be-
cause "it will not insulate society" from the offender because the sanction
leaves the offender at large to perpetuate more mischief.250 In addition, it is
unlikely to serve as a deterrent for one undeterred by the prospect of long
imprisonment or even death, one who will probably not be affected by expa-
triation, nor by the "insidious and demoralizing.., experience of stateless-
ness."
251
Deporting the denaturalized citizen "obviously deprives him of liberty,"
and "it may result also in loss of both property and life; all that makes life
worth living."'25 2 Denationalization might also affect innocent third parties
243. Id.
244. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 161-62 (citing Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)
(Rutledge, J. concurring)).
245. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-100.
246. Id. at 103. The dissent queried:
Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss
of citizenship is a fate worse than death? The seriousness of abandoning one's
country when it is in the grip of mortal conflict precludes denial to Congress of the
power to terminate citizenship here, unless that power is to be denied to Congress
under any circumstance.
Id. at 125-26. As the dissent further opined: "to insist that denationalization is 'cruel and un-
usual' punishment is to stretch that concept beyond the breaking point." Id. at 125.
247. Id. at lI l.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 112
252. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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related to the deportee, and the "consequences of such a deprivation may
even rest heavily upon his children.,
253
E. Birthright Citizenship as a Fundamental Right
The Court's decisions appear to view citizenship as a type of non-
derogable "super-right ' 254 as exemplified by Chief Justice Warren's charac-
terization of citizenship as "the right to have rights. ' 255 In Trop, the Court
referred to a person's "fundamental right of citizenship" as secure unless the
person acts to voluntarily renounce or abandon it.256 Regarding this "rights
perspective" on the loss of citizenship, Aleinikoff observed that Justice
Black's finding in Afroyim that there is "a constitutional right to remain a
citizen" has significant implications. 257 Referring to citizenship as a right
"gives it weight [and] shifts the burden to the government to produce com-
pelling reasons for its actions that abridge or deny citizenship. '258 If citizen-
ship is a right then, according to Aleinikoff, "our usual understanding" is
that it may not be taken away without ascertainment of an intent-to-
relinquish or a voluntary waiver.259 Yet, the rights perspective is fraught with
difficulties because the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak in terms of
rights nor does it establish an irrevocable right of citizenship. 260 Aleinikoff
suggested that a claim of an irrevocable right in citizenship based on the
Fourteenth Amendment could be that citizenship is a "fundamental right"
protected by a substantive reading of the Fifth Amendment due process
clause or perhaps implicit in the structure of the constitutional system.26'
Aleinikoff argued that denationalization does not necessarily involve the
loss of the "rights to have rights" unless it leads to statelessness.262 Thus, Al-
einikoff concluded that building a case for the right to citizenship on the ills
facing denationalized persons is "problematic" because "citizenship is not a
right held against the state" but rather a "relationship with the state.'"263
IV. STATELESSNESS IN A STATECENTRIC SYSTEM
In addition to the above constraints against revocation of citizenship,
both municipal and international law are in accord on undesirability of state-
253. Id.
254. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1486.
255. Id. (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102).
256. Trop, 356 U.S. at 93.
257. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1484.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1485.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1487.
263. Id. at 1487-88.
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lessness, a foreseeable and likely consequence of denationalization. The
Court's recognition of the perils of statelessness, coupled with an emerging
consensus in international law, provides further support for the argument
against denationalization.
De jure statelessness may be original (a person does not acquire nation-
ality under the law of any state at birth), or subsequent (a person becomes
stateless later in life by losing his nationality and not acquiring another).264
De facto statelessness refers to "those persons with an ineffective nationality
or those who cannot establish their nationality." '265 Persons who, "having left
the country of which they were nationals, no longer enjoy the protection and
assistance of their national authorities, either because these authorities refuse
to grant them assistance and protection, or because they themselves renounce
the assistance and protection of the countries of which they are nationals." 2"
Stateless persons do not hold nationality under the law of any state and
are therefore abysmally disadvantaged in any effort to secure rights or pro-
tection in the international domain.267 Hundreds of thousands of stateless
people around the world continue to exist in legal limbo and are subject to
grave violations of their human rights.268
Yet, the very linkage of human rights protections and enforcement to
nationality and statehood means that persons who are denationalized and
rendered stateless continue to face peril in the international system of states.
Stateless persons lack the usual legal protections and remedies, and, if
aggrieved, "there is no State which is competent to take up their case.- 269 In
international law, stateless persons are without protections from wanton mal-
treatment by state entities "apart from restraints of morality or obligations
expressly laid down by treaty. 27°
Statelessness is generally regarded as a most unpropitious condition,
and the "evils of statelessness" are recognized in international law by many
publicists who have "unanimously disapproved of statutes which denational-
ize individuals without regard to whether they have dual nationality. 2 71 The
centrality of the nationality concept is highlighted by a plethora of interna-
tional treaties and conventions affecting nationality. 272
264. See, e.g., Rachel Settlage, No Place to Call Home: Stateless Vietnamese Asylum-
Seekers in Hong Kong, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 187, 189-90 (1997) (discussing the plight of
thousands of ethnic-Chinese migrants from Vietnam residing in Hong Kong).
265. Id. at 189-90.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 160-61 (citing 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (8th
ed., Lauterpacht, 1955)).
270. Id.
271. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 161.
272. Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 37, at 525 (citing an extensive list of international
treaties or conventions specifically dealing with nationality compiled by Nissam Bar-Yaacov
and P. Weis including: 1906 Rio de Janeiro Convention on the Status of Naturalised Citizens;
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A consistent theme in these treaties and declarations over the past fifty
years has been an enunciation and elaboration of the right to nationality. The
harsh consequences of statelessness led to "reaffirmation" of the right to na-
tionality273 in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article fifteen, which states, "everyone has the right to a nationality" and
that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." 274 The Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article twenty-four, also states
that "every child has a right to nationality. 275 In the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, parties under-
take to guarantee the right of everyone to enjoy "the [civil] right to national-
271ity" without distinction as to race, national, or ethnic origin. 6 Moreover, in
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, state parties undertake to grant women "equal rights with men to
acquire, change or retain their nationality" and to ensure that "neither mar-
riage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage
shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or
force upon her the nationality of her husband. 277 In 1989, Article seven of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child included "the right to acquire a
nationality" and state parties are specifically enjoined to ensure the imple-
mentation of this and other rights in cases "where the child would otherwise
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws;
1930 Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality; 1930
Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness; 1933 Montevideo Convention on Nationality;
1933 Montevideo Convention on Nationality of Women; 1954 Convention Relating to Status
of Stateless Persons; 1954 Convention on Nationality Between the Members of the Arab
League; 1957 United Nations' Convention on the Nationality of Married Women; 1963 Euro-
pean Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in
Cases of Multiple Nationality; 1973 Convention for the Reduction of the Number of Cases of
Statelessness; 1977 Protocol to the European Convention on Reduction of cases of Multiple
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality; and 1977 Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Reduction of cases of Multiple Nationality and Mili-
tary Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. Nissim Bar-Yaacov, Dual Nationality
(1961)). Id. See also European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, Europe. T.S. No.
166. Id.
273. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 161 (citing U.N. Doc. No. A/810, at 71, 74 (1948) (adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 10, 1948)). See also A Study on Statelessness, U.N.
Doc. No. E/1112 (1949); Second Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/75 (1953); Weis, The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, 11 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1073 (1962).
274. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/810 (1948), Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in HENKIN BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (1993).
275. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 158.
276. International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 271, at 165.
277. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, (1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) reprinted in HENKIN, supra note
271, at 174.
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be stateless." '278 With respect to regional instruments, Protocol number four
of the European convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms articles state: "No one shall be expelled ... from the terri-
tory of the State of which he is a nation" and "no one shall be deprived of the
right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national. 279 Mean-
while, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man declares
"every person has the right to the nationality to which he is entitled by law
and to change it, if he so wishes, for the nationality of any other country that
is willing to grant it to him. ' 28" Article twenty of the American Convention
on Human Rights states "every person has a right to a nationality. .. every
person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was
born if he does not have the right to any other nationality. 281 It adds, "No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or the right to change
it. ''282 While the African Charter on Human and People's Rights does not
explicitly provide a "right to nationality," it states that every person has a
right to "return to his country"--unfortunately the right appears subject to
very broad "restrictions provided for by law for the protection of national se-
curity, law and order, public health or morality." '283 Consistent with this bias
against statelessness, refugees and other displaced persons who are subject to
expulsion on the limited grounds of national security or public order must be
given "a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another
country."2 84
Although these documents are often treated as soft law rather than so
called hard law, taken in collocation, they indicate that an international norm
against statelessness may have emerged sufficient to constitute a principle of
customary international law. 285 States rarely resort to denationalization, and
278. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, (1989) re-
printed in HENKiN, supra note 271, at 188-89.
279. Protocol (No. 4) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than those Already
Included in the Convention and in the Protocol Thereto, E.T.S 46, 7 I.L.M. 978 (1986), 58
A.J.i.L. 334 (1964) reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 271, at 241.
280. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States (March 30-May 2, 1948), reprinted
in HENKIN, supra note 271, at 287-89.
281. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970) reprinted in
HENKIN, supra note 271, 290, 296.
282. Id.
283. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982) reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 271, at 311, 313.
284. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, July 28, 1951,
reprinted in HENKIN supra note 271, 208.
285. For an analysis of how United Nations resolutions, declarations and international
agreements harden and enter the corpus of customary international law, see generally J.M
Spectar, Pay Me Fairly Kathie Lee, The Right to a Living Wage, and a Proposed Protocol, 20
N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 61, 74-80 (2000). See also Gunlicks supra note 145, at 565
(citing interview with Ralph G. Steinhardt, Professor of International Law and International
Relations, The George Washington University Law School (Oct. 19, 1994)).
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statelessness is universally condemned. In fact, as early as 1954, a United
Nations survey of the nationality laws of eighty-four nations revealed that
only the Philippines and Turkey imposed denationalization as a penalty for
desertion.286
Although the United States is not specifically bound by the treaties on
statelessness, because it is not a party, the United States has ratified the
Charter of the Organization of American States ("OAS"), and OAS members
have declared that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of man
"contains and defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Char-
ter." '287 Furthermore, these international treaties are, according to Article VI
(the supremacy clause), part of U.S. federal law and the customary interna-
tional legal presumptions against statelessness are also incorporated as well
under the renowned Supreme Court ruling in the Paquete Habana case.2 88
The United States Supreme Court's judicial aversion to statelessness
suggests that the Court would most likely reject any revocation of Walker's
citizenship. The Court has enunciated firm and unambiguous statements
about the ills and perils of statelessness, and considers successful denation-
alization proceedings as precursors to potential statelessness. Justice Rut-
lege, in a concurring opinion in Klapprott was concerned about the involun-
tary expatriation or revocation of citizenship-the most "comprehensive and
basic right of all,"-because "in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty
of banishment." '289 Since American citizenship is "one of the most valuable
rights in the world today" the Court is always concerned about the "grave
practical consequences" of denationalization and the prospect of stateless-
ness.2' As the Afroyim Court noted, loss of citizenship may mean that a per-
son is "left without the protection of citizenship in any country in the
world"-the condition of statelessness.291
Denationalization as a punishment "strips the citizen of his status in the
national and international political community. 292 The "calamity" of state-
lessness is more than simply the loss of specific rights, it is also "the loss of
286. See Laws Concerning Nationality, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954); Id. at
379, 461; cf. Nationality Law of August 22, 1907, Art. 17(2).
287. Gunlicks, supra note 146, at 565 (citing Advisory Opinion No. OC-10/89, Interpre-
tation of the American Declaration, 29 1.L.M. 379, 389 (Inter-American Court of Human
Rights)).
288. See discussion in Gunlicks, supra note 146, at 564. International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators ... for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15 (1895)).
289. Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 317 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
290. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 160
291. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267-68.
292. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever." 293 The
stateless person may be compelled to roam the planet "shunted from nation
to nation, there being no one obligated or willing to receive him," and he
may even wind up under "the dubious sanctuary" of a tyrannical regime.294
In the condition of statelessness:
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens
to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and
presumably as long as he remained in this country he would enjoy the lim-
ited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless. Fur-
thermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the
expatriate has lost the right to have rights. 295
Statelessness, the Court reasoned, was inconsistent with American con-
cept of human dignity as it left the offender "fair game for the despoiler at
home and the oppressor abroad."296 Denationalized persons would find it dif-
ficult or impossible to avail themselves of judicial relief to "alleviate the po-
tential rigors of statelessness." 297
The Supreme Court has also condemned the practice of state-sanctioned
statelessness as barbaric or uncivilized. The Court has found "virtual una-
nimity" among civilized nations for the proposition that "statelessness is not
to be imposed as punishment for crime.- 298 Denationalization is abhorrent to
the Constitution because it "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-
increasing fear and distress." 299 The stateless person knows not what dis-
criminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be di-
rected against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native
land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally
decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the inter-
national community of democracies. 30 0
293. Id.
294. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 161 (citing ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 294
(1951)). See also SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
UNITED STATES 244-53 (1934); Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Nationality, 23
GEO. L. J. 250 (1934); Holborn, The Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920-1938, 32 AM. J.
INT'L L. 680 (1938).
295. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
296. Id. at 102.
297. Id.
298. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. But the dissent countered: "Many civilized nations impose
loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited activities" even while observing
that "these provisions are often, but not always, applicable only to naturalized citizens." Id. at
126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally Laws Concerning Nationality, U.N. Doc. No.
ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954). Other countries such as the Philippines have made wartime deser-
tion result in loss of citizenship-native-born or naturalized. See Philippine Commonwealth
Act No. 63 of Oct. 21, 1936, as amended by Republic Act No. 106 of June 2, 1947, U.N.
Doc., supra, at 379.
299. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102.
300. Id.
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While a stateless person may not endure all disastrous consequences of
this fate, the possibility makes the punishment of denationalization "obnox-
ious. '0
Ironically, the rejection of statelessness and the support for statecentric-
ity in the context of citizenship is done in the name of human rights. Yet,
this leads to a peculiar position of defending the state in the name of human
rights-a non sequitur for many proponents of human rights. The United
States Supreme Court's position against statelessness reinforces the primacy
of the nation state and has significant consequences for the development of
international human rights in global society. The anti-statelessness principle
expresses little faith in the protections of international law and the human
rights domain. An endorsement of the Court's reasoning leaves cosmopoli-
tan theorist in the paradoxical position of defending national citizenship,
which is in itself, a stumbling block to the achievement of human rights in
the age of globalization. Additionally, one is left in the curious position of
seeming to endorse the benign ethnocentrism of the Court's reasoning about
the importance of American citizenship in a world full of all sorts of un-
speakable dangers. Recall that the Afroyim Court warned losing American
citizenship is as serious a fate as losing life itself. The message is that human
rights can only be protected by the nation state, notwithstanding the claims
of the global citizenship paradigm. In addition, the Court's fear that dena-
tionalization can create "rightless" people is largely a consequence of the
Court's reluctance to incorporate international human rights norms into U.S.
legal disputes as well as its reluctance to impose substantive limits on Con-
gressional power to deport aliens.30 2 Yet, in a statecentric system, the Court's
nationalistic rationale against denationalization is lesser of two evils-even
if it does not bode well for global human rights discourse.
CONCLUSION
John Walker's odyssey sparked a heated citizenship debate that war-
ranted a second look at citizenship theory and practice on the question of de-
301. Id. (citing Study on Statelessness, U.N.Doc. No. E/i 112; Seckler-Hudson, State-
lessness: With Special Reference to the United States; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of
Citizens Abroad, 262, 334). Yet the Trop dissent strongly rejected this supposition, arguing
that denationalized persons, now aliens in the U.S. had significant constitutional protections
and thus nothing to fear. In effect, the much-vaunted unpredictability of the alien's post-
denationalization status was a canard: "Presumably a denationalized person becomes an alien
vis-a-vis the United States. The very substantial rights and privileges that the alien in this
country enjoys under the federal and state constitutions puts him in a very different condition
from that of an outlaw in fifteenth-century England. He need not be in constant fear lest some
dire and unforeseen fate be imposed on him by arbitrary governmental action--certainly not
'while this Court sits."' Trop, 356 U.S. at 127. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In addition to "the
multitudinous decisions of this Court protective of the rights of aliens" "the assumption that
brutal treatment is the inevitable lot of denationalized persons found in other countries is a
slender basis on which to strike down an Act of Congress otherwise amply sustainable." Id.
302. Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1487.
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nationalization. Despite the often-clashing conceptions of citizenship in ex-
tant theories, there is general recognition of the precious nature of citizen-
ship and very little judicial support for denationalization. Despite an aversion
to revocation of citizenship, both proponents of liberal and the civic republi-
can conceptions of citizenship may countenance revocation in the event of
treason or other acts of similar magnitude that fundamentally threaten the se-
curity and viability of the state. In addition, a survey of the Court's jurispru-
dence of denationalization shows a strong tradition of judicial hostility to in-
voluntary expatriation of native-born citizens. In fact, the cases reflect an
evolving understanding of American citizenship as something of a funda-
mental right as well as a non-derogable human right. Fourteenth Amendment
citizenship is "virtually impossible to lose" unless the citizen consents or
voluntarily relinquishes it.3" 3 The Court has made it exceedingly difficult for
Congress to abridge, restrict or curtail Fourteenth Amendment citizenship
even for reasons such as desertion during war. The government faces a very
heavy burden in denationalization proceedings and will not prevail unless it
meets Afroyim's intent to relinquish test and the "demanding" standard in
Kungys.304
Finally, the Court's traditional hostility to revocation is informed by an
emerging consensus about the perils of statelessness in the international sys-
tem of states. Ironically, the Court's endorsement of the emerging interna-
tional norm against statelessness provides a rare instance where conserva-
tive-nationalist jurisprudence, and its apotheosis of statecentricism, has the
effect of strengthening an emerging international norm.
303. Schuck, supra note 64, at 11-12.
304. Id.
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